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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
lldar Dursunov appeals from the district court's order dismissing his post-
conviction claims without an evidentiary hearing. 1 Mr. Dursunov asserts that the district 
court erred when it concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
necessitating an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his attorney was ineffective for 
failing to obtain a confidential psychosexual evaluation rather than having him submit to 
a court-ordered one. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
lldar Dursunov filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief in which he 
asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage on a 
charge of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen following his guilty plea. His claims 
primarily concerned the preparation and use of a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation 
conducted by Dr. Horton. (R., pp.4-8.) 
As relevant to this appeal,2 Mr. Dursunov claimed that his attorney never 
obtained a confidential psychosexual evaluation prior to advising him to plead guilty, 
and never informed him that he could have received a confidential psychosexual 
evaluation. (R., pp.5-6.) He then asserted that "[h]ad [he] been so informed, [he] would 
have obtained such an evaluation." (R., p.6.) He further asserted that had Dr. Horton's 
1 The district court dismissed Mr. Dursunov's claims in response to the State's Motion 
for Summary Disposition and after issuing a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post Conviction 
Petition, noting that, with one exception, the two "paralleled" each other. (Tr., p.10, 
Ls.6-13.) 
1 
evaluation been a confidential psychosexual evaluation, he would not have released it 
to the court because it was unfavorable to him, and would have instead obtained a 
second such evaluation from Gail Ater, 3 w~1ich would have been favorable. (R., p.6.) In 
addition to his verified petition, Mr. Dursunov offered transcripts from his Rule 35 
hearing, sentencing hearing, and the Court of Appeals' opinion from his direct appeal. 
As for prejudice, Mr. Dursunov alleged, "[t]here is a reasonable probability that the Court 
would have imposed a lesser sentence had it only considered Ms. [sic] Atler's [sic] 
evaluation and not been exposed to Dr. Horton's evaluation." (R., pp.4-8.) 
The State filed an answer in which it asserted the usual affirmative defenses. 
(R., pp.145-47.) It then filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal along with a Brief in 
Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal, in which it argued, inter alia, that all of 
Mr. Dursunov's claims should be dismissed because he "did not support his application 
for post-conviction relief with any affidavit or other evidence other than the record of the 
case below." (R., p.159.) 
With respect to Mr. Dursunov's claim that, had the psychosexual evaluation been 
confidential, he would not have turned it over to the district court and would have 
obtained a second evaluation from Gail Ater, the State responded by arguing, 
Not liking the results of the psychosexual evaluation is not a sufficient 
reason for post conviction relief. Petitioner argued that he would have 
shopped for a favorable psychosexual evaluation for the court if he knew 
2 Mr. Dursunov raised a number of other claims, the dismissal of which is not being 
challenged on appeal. 
3 Mr. Dursunov did obtain a limited evaluation from Mr. Ater following sentencing. 
Mr. Ater testified at Mr. Dursunov's Rule 35 hearing that, contrary to Dr. Horton's report, 
"neither [his] cultural background nor [his] English language skills would prevent [him] 
from engaging in community-based sex offender treatment." Mr. Ater further testified 
that Mr. Dursunov was a "low/moderate risk to reoffend," whereas Dr. Horton opined 
that he was a "moderate/high risk" to do so. (R., p.6.) 
2 
the court-ordered evaluation was going to be unfavorable. He misses the 
point of a psychosexual evaluation. He is not entitled to relief on this 
ground, which must be dismissed. 
(R., pp.162-63.) 
The district court then issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post Conviction 
Petition. (R., p.334.) With respect to Mr. Dursunov's claim, the district court found, 
The Court is not aware of any law that requires defense counsel to obtain 
psychosexual evaluations prior to advising defendants to enter a plea in a 
sex case. Nor is the Court aware of any standards applicable in these 
types of cases that recommend that counsel obtain such evaluations. It 
was clear that this was an "open recommendation" plea bargain. If 
Dursunov had obtained such an evaluation for use in the plea bargaining 
process and had it been "detrimental" sure counsel would not have 
disclosed that to the State. If he had, surely it would not have resulted in a 
favorable recommendation from the State. If the evaluation had been 
"favorable" the Court finds that it would have made little difference in this 
case. The Court ordered evaluation recommended the "rider" program. 
The "favorable" recommendation of Mr. Ater presented at the Rule 35 
hearing recommended "probation." Judge Bevan rejected both 
recommendations and imposed a penitentiary sentence primarily due to 
the seriousness of t~1is offense and Dursunov's lack of acceptance of 
responsibility. The decision to obtain or not obtain such an evaluation 
prior to advising a defendant to enter a guilty plea is clearly a strategy 
decision and does not under the facts of this case constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Assuming arguendo that it does, the Court finds no 
prejudice to Dursunov. The State had a prosecutable case. Dursunov 
has made no showing that a "favorable" evaluation would have deterred 
the State from insisting on a plea of guilty regardless of the 
recommendations of an evaluator. Similarly, he has made no showing 
that such an evaluation would have in any way affected the sentence 
ultimately imposed. Moreover, Dursunov stated at the time of his plea that 
there was not anything that he asked his attorney to do that was not done. 
The written guilty plea advisory form (Question 51) confirmed that he was 
satisfied with his attorney's representation. The Court finds there is no 
merit to this portion of Dursanov's [sic] claim. 
(R., pp.339-40.) 
Mr. Dursunov did not file any additional materials in support of his claims or in 
response to the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal. (Tr., p.3, L.12 - p.4, L.21.) In 
3 
granting the State's motion and dismissing on its own notice, the district court noted that 
the two "paralleled" each other, except for one issue covered in its notice but not 
covered in the State's motion.4 Mr. Dursunov filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the 
district court's order dismissing his post-conviction petition. (R., p.369.) 
4 The additional issue had to do with Mr. Dursunov's answers to questions in the Guilty 
Plea Advisory Form. (Tr., p.5, L.20 - p.6, L.2.) 
4 
ISSUE 




The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Dursunov's Post-Conviction 
Claim --
A. Introduction 
Tl1e district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Dursunov's claim that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to advise him that he 
could have obtained a confidential psychosexual report prior to pleading guilty. He 
contends that the district court erred in finding, at the summary judgment stage, that 
failing to do so did not constitute deficient performance, and when it found that, 
assuming it was deficient performance, there was no prejudice shown. 
B. Standards Of Review 
1. Summary Dismissal 
An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified 
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. 
The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its 
allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id. 
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when the 
court is satisfied the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by 
further proceedings. I.C. § 19-4906 (b). In considering summary dismissal in a case 
where evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be 
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responsible for resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (addressing case where State did not file a response to 
petition) (citing Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 (1982) (addressing 
case with stipulated facts)). However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required 
to accept the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but it need not accept 
the petitioner's conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). 
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if a material issue 
of fact exists. I.C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that, if 
resolved in the applicant's favor. would entitle the applicant to relief, summary 
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be held. Baldwin v. State, 145 
Idaho 148, 153 (2008). At the summary dismissal stage the petitioner need only 
present prima facie evidence of both prongs. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 
(2010). 
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the 
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a 
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court 
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions 
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903 
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Owen v. 
State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997). 
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2. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant 
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of 
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). Further, the 
Constitution guarantees a fair trial through its Due Process Clauses, but it defines the 
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685. 
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's 
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on 
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the 
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth 
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the 
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279 (1998). 
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also 
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
8 
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by 
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), 
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding 
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different," 
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly 
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner 
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that ... the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." 
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Dursunov's Post-
Conviction Claim 
With respect to Mr. Dursunov's claim, the district court found, 
The Court is not aware of any law that requires defense counsel to obtain 
psychosexual evaluations prior to advising defendants to enter a plea in a 
sex case. Nor is the Court aware of any standards applicable in these 
types of cases that recommend that counsel obtain such evaluations. It 
was clear that this was an "open recommendation" plea bargain. If 
Dursunov had obtained such an evaluation for use in the plea bargaining 
process and had it been "detrimental" sure counsel would not have 
disclosed that to the State. If he had, surely it would not have resulted in a 
favorable recommendation from the State. If the evaluation had been 
"favorable" the Court finds that it would have made little difference in this 
case. The Court ordered evaluation recommended the "rider" program. 
The "favorable" recommendation of Mr. Ater presented at the Rule 35 
hearing recommended "probation." Judge Bevan rejected both 
recommendations and imposed a penitentiary sentence primarily due to 
the seriousness of this offense and Dursunov's lack of acceptance of 
responsibility. The decision to obtain or not obtain such an evaluation 
prior to advising a defendant to enter a guilty plea is clearly a strategy 
decision and does not under the facts of this case constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Assuming arguendo that it does, the Court finds no 
prejudice to Dursunov. The State had a prosecutable case. Dursunov 
has made no showing that a "favorable" evaluation would have deterred 
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the State from insisting on a plea of guilty regardless of the 
recommendations of an evaluator. Similarly, he has made no showing 
that such an evaluation would have in any way affected the sentence 
ultimately imposed. Moreover, Dursunov stated at the time of his plea that 
there was not anything that he asked his attorney to do that was not done. 
The written guilty plea advisory form (Question 51) confirmed that he was 
satisfied with his attorney's representation.[5] The Court finds there is no 
merit to this portion of Dursanov's [sic] claim. 
(R., pp.339-40.) 
At the hearing on its notice of intent to dismiss the petition, the district court 
reiterated the above, while adding, 
[T]he Court of Appeals has also issued an opinion in the case of Juan 
Gonzalez [sic] vs. State of Idaho, which was filed on April 1ih, 2011,[6] 
and that was filed after the briefing was filed and the court's notice was 
filed. Interestingly, that case answers a question that I think I raised in the 
court's notice with regard to the issue of a petitioner or a defendant 
requesting a confidential psychological evaluation. The court 
acknowledged, as I did, that there is no law that we're aware of in Idaho 
that would require that. 
(Tr., p.6, Ls.3-12.) 
Gonzales is distinguishable from the facts of Mr. Dursunov's case. In Gonzales, 
it was argued that defense counsel was ineffective for, inter alia, failing to obtain a 
confidential psychosexual evaluation before advising Gonzales as to whether he should 
participate in a court-ordered evaluation. During the court-ordered evaluation, Gonzales 
disclosed a number of uncharged crimes involving both the victim of the lewd conduct 
charge to which he pleaded guilty (his minor daughter) and two other victims. In 
rejecting this claim, the Court noted, "[c]ounsel's failure to arrange a defense evaluation 
5 This basis for rejecting Mr. Dursunov's claim is unpersuasive in light of his sworn 
statement that he was never advised that he could have obtained such an evaluation. 
Obviously, Mr. Dursunov could not have requested that his attorney do something that 
he did not know his attorney could do. 
6 See Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 
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in order to prepare for the possible incriminating outcome of a subsequent evaluation 
does not constitute deficient performance." Gonzales, 151 Idaho at 173-74. 
Mr. Dursunov has put forth a different argument, namely that his attorney was 
ineffective for failing to ensure that any psychosexual evaluation that he participated in 
was confidential unless and until he decided to disclose it to the district court and the 
State. Furthermore, in Gonzales the petitioner was aware of his ability to obtain an 
independent psychosexual evaluation, as his attorney informed the court that he would 
obtain such an evaluation in addition to the court-ordered evaluation at the time it was 
ordered.7 Id. The failure to advise Mr. Dursunov of the ability to obtain such a 
confidential evaluation, along with the contents of the court-ordered evaluation, raised a 
genuine issue of material fact as to ineffective assistance of counsel, which, as will be 
argued below, resulted in prejudice in the form of a greater sentence. 
In Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448 (Ct. App. 2009), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
announced a three factor test in assessing the prejudice prong with respect to 
psychosexual evaluations. Id. at 464-65. This test was set forth as follows: 
The first factor is whether the content of the PSE itself is materially 
unfavorable. The PSE should be reviewed to determine the extent and 
harmful character of statements and admissions made by the applicant 
and the conclusions of the evaluator based upon those statements and 
admissions to determine the level of negativity, if any. If the PSE is not 
materially unfavorable, then the second prong of the Strickland standard 
has not been met. If the PSE is materially unfavorable to the applicant, 
the level of its negativity will then be weighed with two additional factors. 
The second factor is the extent of the sentencing court's reliance on the 
PSE if it can be demonstrated from the record. The third factor is the 
totality of the evidence before the sentencing court. 
Id. at 464. 
7 Inexplicably, a separate defense evaluation was not conducted. Id. at 173. 
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As quoted above, with respect to the prejudice prong, the district court held that 
there was no prejudice because a favorable report, such as the one testified to by 
Mr. Ater, "would have made little difference in this case" as Judge Bevan's decision to 
impose a penitentiary sentence was "primarily due to the seriousness of this offense 
and Dursunov's lack of acceptance of responsibility." (R., p.339.) The district court 
further held that Mr. Dursunov "has made no showing that such an evaluation would 
have in any way affected the sentence ultimately imposed." (R., p.340.) For the 
reasons set forth below, the district court's holdings on the prejudice prong are 
incorrect. 
A review of the numerous references made by the district court to the evaluation 
demonstrates that Mr. Dursunov made a prima facie showing of the first (that the report 
was materially unfavorable) and the second (extent of reliance) factors. Those 
references are as follows: 
Dr. Horton recommends that in his words perhaps the court consider 
retained jurisdiction or county jail. I reject such a suggestion. As noted, 
and somewhat ironically in his report given that recommendation, the 
defendant is not amenable to treatment. He remains in extreme denial 
and, if placed on probation, would be subject to what Dr. Horton would 
have to be very tight supervision. Unfortunately, very tight supervision is 
nonexistent in the Idaho probation system today. 
(R., p.22 (Sentencing Tr.,8 p.40, Ls.7-17) (emphasis added).) 
[T]his is not a standard lewd and lascivious case, because, frankly, I find 
from the nature of the record before me, including Dr. Horton's report as 
well as the letters, frankly, from your own family, that this is a case in 
which all blame has been attempted to be deflected onto this minor child, 
both by yourself and your family ... so I determine that you clearly have 
attempted to deflect blame for your own conduct onto the minor child, 
which in any lewd and lascivious case supports the determination that a 
significant sentence is in order. 
8 The sentencing transcript was made a part of the record in the post-conviction file. 
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(R., p.22 (Sentencing Tr., p.42, Ls.5-23) (emphases added).) 
In terms of Dr. Horton's report, I believe it should be referenced in terms of 
my conclusions in this case, first of all, that the defendant is a moderate 
risk for reoffense, but beyond that and more importantly as noted by the 
doctor, that the defendant is in extreme denial, to quote his words, that 
recidivism is a potentiality, particularly in this court's experience where the 
defendant is not eligible for, due to several factors, treatment, has little 
motivation for the same and is, quote, apparently lying about the incident 
to minimize the effect upon the victim and project some blame on the 
victim for the incident. Again, that factor, in this court's view, is an 
appropriate one to consider given the nature of this charge and my 
conclusion relative to an appropriate and just sentence. 
(R., pp.22-23 (Sentencing Tr., p.43, L.12- p.44, L.4).) 
I determine, based upon the total circumstances involved, Mr. Dursunov, 
including the report from Dr. Horton and the lack of motivation for 
treatment that you have, that treatment and rehabilitation in the community 
is not an option. 
(R., p.23 (Sentencing Tr., p.45, Ls.9-15) (emphasis added).) 
As can be seen from the sentencing court's statements, not only did the court 
rely upon Dr. Horton's report to reach its sentencing decision, it specifically relied upon 
portions of Dr. Horton's report in concluding that Mr. Dursunov had not accepted 
responsibility, which the post-conviction court concluded was one of the two primary 
reasons that the sentence received by Mr. Dursunov was imposed. 
With respect to the third factor, the totality of evidence before the sentencing 
court, the passages quoted above indicate that the only other cited source for a failure 
to accept responsibility were the letters from his family. (R., p.22 (Sentencing Tr., p.42, 
Ls.5-23).) The district court explained that both Dr. Horton's report "as well as the 
letters, frankly from your own family" indicated that Mr. Dursunov and his family were 
attempting to deflect blame onto the victim. (Id.) Obviously, Mr. Dursunov cannot 
control what his family writes, and the main evidence indicating a lack of acceptance of 
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responsibility on the part of Mr. Dursunov came from Dr. Horton's report. A review of 
tl1e PSI shows that the PSI writer's conclusion concerning Mr. Dursunov's failure to take 
responsibility and to blame the victim came from that writer's review of Dr. Horton's 
report.9 (PSI, pp.10-12.) 
Because Mr. Dursunov made a prima facie showing as to both prongs of 
Strickland, the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his claim. As such, 
Mr. Dursunov respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his claim, and remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing. 
D. The State's Claim That Mr. Dursunov's Petition Was Not Supported By An 
Affidavit Was Incorrect 
The State filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal along with a Brief in Support of 
Motion for Summary Dismissal, in which it argued, inter afia, that all of Mr. Dursunov's 
claims should be dismissed because he "did not support his application for post-
conviction relief with any affidavit or other evidence other than the record of the case 
below." (R., p.159.) On this point, the State was incorrect, as the facts set forth in 
Mr. Dursunov's verified petition, which were uncontroverted, were required to be 
accepted as true for purposes of deciding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. 
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545 (1975) ("[U]ntil the allegations contained in a verified 
application for post-conviction relief are controverted by the State, they must be deemed 
to be true for the purpose of determining if an evidentiary hearing is to be held. A 
9 In his statements to the PSI writer, Mr. Dursunov expressed remorse and regret, 
describing his behavior as a "mistake" that he was still "processing." (PSI, p.11.) In 
describing how he felt about committing the crime, Mr. Dursunov stated, "'I feel really 
bad and guilty about what I done. I'm so sorry for my mistake and lack of judgement 
14 
motion to dismiss, unsupported by affidavits, depositions or other materials, does not 
controvert the allegations in the petition") (citations omitted). 10 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Dursunov respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the district court's order dismissing his post-conviction petition as to the 
claim raised in this appeal, and remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing on that 
claim. 
DATED this 1ih day of January, 2012. 
SPE~CERJ. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
[sic]."' (PSI, p.4.) This could hardly be described as blaming the victim or failing to take 
responsibility. 
10 Although the district court does not appear to have relied upon the State's argument 
on this point in dismissing Mr. Dursunov's claims (Tr., p.5, L.20 - p.10, L.13), 
Mr. Dursunov rebuts the argument here lest this Court rely upon it in a "right for the 
wrong reason" analysis. 
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